عنوان مقاله [English]
In his works, Kriegel criticizes a common viewpoint in the philosophy of mind upon which there is no direct relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. He knows the problem of this view in that its proponents have not been able to make distinction between different kinds of self-consciousness. Kriegel, after making distinction between four different kinds of self-consciousness, refers to this point that there is a kind of self-consciousness which is prior to every other kind of self-consciousness. This kind of self-consciousness, called intransitive state self-consciousness, accompanies all other kinds of consciousness. Indeed, intransitive state self- consciousness is a kind of self-consciousness that is implicitly along with a conscious mental state and it is the root of first-person view. Kriegel’s viewpoint has a long background in the history of western philosophy inasmuch as its roots can be traced back to Aristotle’s philosophy. According to Aristotle, conscious being attains self-consciousness through or implicitly with being conscious of something else. Avicenna criticizes this Aristotelian viewpoint in his works and along with dividing self-consciousness into two different kinds: self-awareness and awareness of awareness emphasizes this point that first kind of self-consciousness is the very essence of conscious being and is the same as its specific existence. Accordingly, it is not separated from the conscious being and it is not depended on the presence of other beings and being conscious of them. So, it is prior to every other kind of consciousness. This Avicenna’s criticism although is principally directed at Aristotle, it equally aims the Kriegel’s viewpoint.