عنوان مقاله [English]
In Avicenna’s thought, one of the most important features of experimental propositions which, whereby they are classified among the principles of demonstration, is their attribution with certainty and he has emphasized its certainty in several expressions. However there are a few statements from Avicenna in which- in a way the absolute certainty of experience is denied. This research, using the method of text-oriented analytic interpretation and critical analysis, explicates how the method of experience, according to Avicenna’s own theoretical and practical foundations, cannot yield certainty. Theoretically, two minimum and maximum reasons demonstrated for this. Based on minimal reason the method of experience brings about pure certainty only in the case of useful constant observation. But in the maximum reason even in the manner of permanent occurrence can't be lead to certainty because due to the experience-based on sensations which according to Avicenna’s final analysis are pseudo-certainty, any kind of experience will be pseudo-certainty. This result is not in conflict with Avicenna’s innovational doctrine about the experience-based propositions, according to which these propositions are based on a demonstration propter quid, because he has already explained in his logical works that a demonstration propter quid which its minor premise is not perpetual cannot yield certainty. In addition, assuming possibility of obtaining certainty in the process of experience, in practice, is very difficult to exactly determine and discover the essential cause, whereby reaching the certainty will be very hard and rare.